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Regulation of workers￿dismissal is one of the labor market institutions most commonly in-
voked to explain the large and persistent di⁄erences between European and North American
unemployment rates. From a theoretical point of view, the e⁄ect of ￿ring costs on employ-
ment is ambiguous. Firing costs reduce hiring during expansions, but these costs also reduce
dismissals during downturns. The net e⁄ect depends on di⁄erent factors, including the size
of hiring and ￿ring costs and the degree of persistence of demand and supply shocks. There-
fore, the employment e⁄ect of ￿ring costs is an empirical question that should be evaluated
case by case. The labor market reforms that several European countries have implemented
since the 1980s provide unique information to identify the e⁄ect of ￿ring costs on ￿rms￿labor
demand decisions. In this paper we study the e⁄ects on employment and ￿rms￿productiv-
ity of a Spanish labor market reform that took place in 1984, which eliminated previous
restrictions to use temporary contracts and reduced ￿ring costs under this type of contract.
The consequences of job security provisions on labor market performance have been
broadly analyzed both at the theoretical and at the empirical level and using very di⁄erent
approaches. The studies di⁄er in the data used (aggregate data, industry-level data, house-
hold and ￿rm level data), the scope of the analysis (from the study of a particular country to
cross-country comparisons), and on the methodological approach. The results are not con-
clusive: whereas some contributions provide evidence supporting that job security provisions
have negative e⁄ects on employment and activity rates as well as on the speed of adjustment
of employment and output, some others ￿nd negligible e⁄ects on the level of employment.
The main purpose of this paper is to evaluate the e⁄ects on employment, job turnover
and productivity of a labor market reform in Spain occurred in 1984, which allowed the
widespread use of ￿xed-term or temporary contracts and reduced the redundancy payments
at termination of these contracts. Before the reform, the use of temporary contract was
subject to the principle of causality, so that these contracts had already been used to a
certain extent in agriculture, construction and services industries; however, their use in
1manufacturing had been very scarce. After the reform, temporary contracts could be applied
by any ￿rm, irrespective of their size, industry or performance, to any type of worker,
irrespective of their occupation, age, or sex. Nevertheless, the stringent dismissal regulations
for inde￿nite-duration or permanent contracts remained unchanged after the reform.
Our approach combines the estimation of a micro-econometric dynamic structural model
of labor demand with a comparison of estimated structural parameters before and after
the policy change in 1984. Our primary source of data consists on a longitudinal sample
of 2;356 Spanish manufacturing ￿rms during the period 1982-1993. Thus, we exploit the
time variation in the policy rule, before and after the 1984 reform, to estimate a dynamic
structural model of labor demand for permanent and temporary employment. The e⁄ects of
the reform, regarding temporary workers, are modelled as changes in ￿ring and hiring costs,
and in their relative productivity.
The estimated hiring and ￿ring costs for temporary workers are signi￿cantly lower after
the reform. Experiments using the estimated model show important positive e⁄ects of the
reform on total employment (i.e., a 3.5% increase) and job turnover. Further, the reform
led to a strong substitution of permanent by temporary workers, with a 10% decline in
permanent employment. The e⁄ect on labor productivity is negative, and the e⁄ect on the
value of ￿rms is negligible.
We compare the actual reform with a counterfactual reform consisting on halving ￿ring
costs for both types of contracts. Although the employment increases under both reforms
are alike, the employment composition by contract is very di⁄erent. As a consequence, such
counterfactual reform had led to much larger improvements in the productivity and the value
of ￿rms. Compared with this counterfactual reform, the factual introduction of temporary
contracts leads to excess turnover and a large proportion of employment of workers with low
￿rm-speci￿c experience.
Our approach allows us to overcome some important limitations of an empirical strategy
based on reduced form evidence. First, the fact that the reform under study was applicable
2to any type of ￿rm and to any type of worker, makes implausible a di⁄erences-in-di⁄erences
approach based on comparing the outcomes before and after the reform between agents
a⁄ected and una⁄ected by such reform. Second, given that some other institutional changes
took place in Spain after 1984 (for instance, the Spanish entry in the European Economic
Community in 1986), a reduced form approach does not ensure that we are controlling for the
sort of structural changes that we want to consider, that is, those which a⁄ected ￿ring costs
of temporary workers. And third, we are also interested in the evaluation of counterfactual
policies.
There is a large literature on the structural estimation of dynamic structural models of
labor demand that goes back to the seminal paper by Sargent (1978).1 Our model builds on
and extends recent papers on dynamic structural models of labor demand with non-convex
adjustment costs, such as Rota (2004), and Cooper and Willis (2004). The most relevant
extensions are the following: (i) we consider two types of labor contracts, temporary and
permanent; (ii) our speci￿cation of labor adjustment costs is very general and allows for
￿xed, linear and quadratic adjustment costs which can be di⁄erent for the two types of
contracts; and (iii) the speci￿cation of the unobserved variables in the econometric model
is quite ￿ exible and it includes unobservables in the production function, in the marginal
costs, and in the ￿xed costs of the two types of labor.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide an overview of
the previous literature on the e⁄ects of job security provisions, and describe the institutional
features of the Spanish labor market. Section 3 describes our dataset. In section 4, we
explain the theoretical model as well as our key identi￿cation assumptions to evaluate the
e⁄ects of the policy change. The estimation results of the structural model are provided
in section 4. We present experiments that evaluate the e⁄ects of the reform in section 5.
Section 6 summarizes our main ￿ndings and concludes.
1See Hamermesh (1993) and the recent survey paper by Bond and Van Reenen (2007) for references.
32 The role of job security provisions
2.1 Previous evidence
There is a broad and growing literature on the consequences of job security provisions on
the labor market. A ￿rst line of research uses longitudinal data of countries in order to
evaluate the e⁄ects of severance pay on several labor market outcomes exploiting the di⁄er-
ences across countries. Using a panel of OECD countries and constructing two alternative
measures of severance pay, Lazear (1990) found that severance pay has negative e⁄ects on
employment and activity rates, and a positive e⁄ect on unemployment. Addison and Grosso
(1996) corroborate the positive in￿ uence of severance pay on unemployment, but they ￿nd
very little evidence "to suggest that its contribution to rising unemployment is material".
Burgess, Knetter and Michelacci (2000) evaluated the e⁄ects of job security provisions on the
adjustment speed of employment and output, using longitudinal data on the seven largest
OECD countries disaggregated by 2-digit industries, which allows to control for di⁄erences
in adjustment speed among industries. Their results point out that less regulated countries
show a faster adjustment. Using a sample of OECD and Latin American countries, Heckman
and PagØs (2004) found a strongly negative e⁄ect of job security provisions on employment
rates, such e⁄ect varying substantially among di⁄erent types of workers.
A similar line of research has evaluated the consequences of job security regulations by
means of comparing a small number of countries. Abraham and Houseman (1993, 1994)
compare the adjustment speed of employment and hours in manufacturing industries in
response to demand shocks in several European countries (Germany, France and Belgium)
and in the United States. Their main ￿nding is that the higher costs of adjusting employment
levels in European countries are compensated by the lower costs of adjusting average hours,
and therefore there are no substantial di⁄erences in the adjustment of total labor input.
Bover, Garc￿a-Perea and Portugal (2000) try to explain why unemployment rates in Spain
and Portugal are so di⁄erent even though their labor market institutions appear to share
many similarities. The primary factor explaining the much higher unemployment rate in
4Spain appears to be its lower level of wage ￿ exibility in Spain, combined with a much more
generous system of unemployment insurance.
A second line of research has addressed the e⁄ects of severance payments on employ-
ment by means of calibration of theoretical models. Bentolila and Bertola (1990) calibrate
a partial equilibrium labor demand model using aggregate data of several European coun-
tries, obtaining negligible e⁄ects. In a similar setting, Bertola (1990) ￿nds that job security
provisions do not necessarily lower average employment unless further restrictions on wage
￿ exibility, such as minimum wage legislation, operate. In contrast, Hopenhayn and Rogerson
(1993) calibrate a general equilibrium model using US ￿rm-level data and considering entry
and exit of ￿rms, obtaining that an introduction of ￿ring costs would reduce employment
substantially. Cabrales and Hopenhayn (1997) calibrate a similar model using ￿rm-level
evidence on job matches before and after the 1984 reform which allowed the widespread use
of temporary contracts, ￿nding that the reform has induced a large increase in the turnover
rate but a moderate e⁄ect on employment. G￿ell (2000) analyzes the e⁄ects of temporary
contracts in the context of an e¢ ciency wage model, concluding that the introduction of this
type of contract need not to increase aggregate employment.
A third line of research has exploited data before and after speci￿c reforms in the labor
market in order to evaluate how changes in job security provisions has a⁄ected labor market
outcomes using a di⁄erences-in-di⁄erences approach. Kugler (2004) studies the e⁄ect of
a reduction in ￿ring costs in Colombia with data before and after such reform. The fact
that the Colombian labor market is broken down in workers covered and non covered by the
legislation provides a treatment and a control group which permits a di⁄erences-in-di⁄erences
approach by comparison between the unemployment hazards for these two groups before
and after the reform. The results provide evidence about the negative e⁄ect of severance
payments on employment. Hunt (2000) exploited industry-level German data to conclude
that the German reform in 1985 which facilitated the use of temporary contracts did not
a⁄ect employment adjustment. In a similar line but with a di⁄erent approach, Bentolila
5and Saint-Paul (1992) use ￿rm-level data to evaluate the e⁄ect of a Spanish reform which
introduced temporary contracts and ￿nd a rise in the speed of adjustment, although they
do not use data before the reform.
Our approach combines the estimation of a dynamic structural model of labor demand
with a comparison of estimated structural parameters before and after the policy change in
1984. There is a large literature on the structural estimation of dynamic structural models of
labor demand, which dates back to the seminal paper by Sargent (1978). As mentioned in the
Introduction, our model builds on and extends the recent literature on dynamic structural
models of labor demand with non-convex adjustment costs (Rota, 2004, and Cooper and
Willis, 2004). As far as we know, this is the only dynamic structural model of labor demand
that has been used to evaluate a labor market reform.
2.2 Labor contract regulations in Spain
According to the OECD, the Spanish labor market is among the most regulated in Europe.
Job security rules and, in particular, strong mandatory severance payments, contribute im-
portantly to the rigidity of such regulations.2 The 1984 reform, which eliminated most of
the previous restrictions to the use of temporary contracts, has been one of the major legal
changes of the Spanish labor market in the last two decades. To understand the motiva-
tion of this reform and the context in which it took place, we provide a description of the
institutional background before the reform, and the subsequent changes occurred.
During Franco￿ s regime (1939-1975), the Spanish labor market was characterized by a
hyper-regulated system of industrial relations under the monitoring of a single ￿union￿to
which both employers and employees had to belong. The prohibition of trade unions and
the practical absence of collective bargaining were ￿compensated￿ with regulations that
guaranteed full employment stability: in practice, most jobs were full-time jobs of inde￿nite
2Bentolila and Dolado (1994), using OECD data for selected European countries, ￿nd striking di⁄erences
in regulations about authorization procedures for dismissals and mandatory severance payments for fair and
unfair dismissals, with Denmark and the UK having the less severe, and France, Greece, Portugal and Spain
being the countries with the most stringent regulations.
6duration. This institutional background was transformed progressively after Franco￿ s death
in 1975. The ￿rst important change came in 1977 with the Royal Decree of Industrial
Relations. The o¢ cial single union was dismantled and free trade unions were legalized.
Although the decree also recognized new grounds for fair dismissals based on economic
reasons and simpli￿ed the legal procedures for collective redundancies, job security rules
were basically unchanged.
In 1980, the Estatuto de los Trabajadores (Workers￿Statute, ET hereinafter) established
the conditions for a modern system of collective bargaining comparable to the ones prevailing
in other democratic European countries. However, it maintained many of the legal and
administrative restrictions on dismissals. For permanent workers (those with an inde￿nite-
term contract), mandatory severance payments were 20 days of salary per year of job tenure
(up to a maximum of 1 year wages) if the dismissal is considered ￿ fair￿ , and 45 days (up
to a maximum of 42 months wages) if it is considered ￿ unfair￿ . In principle, there are two
types of fair reasons: those attributable to the worker, when he is considered incompetent or
negligent to perform the tasks for which he was hired, and objective reasons that cannot be
attributed to the worker (for economic or technological reasons). However, the scope of the
second reason was very limited. Furthermore, the burden of proof for a fair dismissal must
be assumed by the ￿rm (see Bentolila, 1997). If the worker does not accept the dismissal
￿ as it is usually the case￿ , he may sue the ￿rm for unfair dismissal. This obliges the ￿rm to
undertake a legal process to prove the fairness of the dismissal, and during this process the
￿rm should assume the legal costs in any case, as well as the salaries of the worker (procedure
wages) in the case that the dismissal is legally declared unfair. Given that the labor courts
are in many cases favorable to the workers, the agreed severance payments can even exceed
the statutory amounts for unfair dismissals. Another legal requirement is the mandatory
advance notice of 30 days. These job security rules for permanent workers have remained
unchanged until 1997.3
3In 1997, trade unions and employer organizations signed the Acuerdo Interconfederal para la Estabilidad
del Empleo (National Agreement on Employment Stability). This agreement led to a new permanent contract
7The ET provided the possibility of temporary or ￿xed-term contracts, which could be
cancelled at termination with a much smaller severance payment and without court or reg-
ulatory intervention. However, the use of temporary contracts was mainly limited to jobs
that were temporary in nature because of the seasonal nature of the production activity, the
need to cover absent posts, or the start-up of a new ￿rm.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of GDP growth and unemployment in Spain. Despite the
fact that GDP was growing at the beginning of the eighties, the unemployment rate followed
its increase, and by the end of 1984, unemployment in Spain was close to its peak (about
21%), and the Spanish economy was su⁄ering the dismantling process of obsolete plants in
the heavy industries. This fact, together with the complaints of entrepreneurs about the rigid
employment legislation, forced the government to broaden the scope of temporary contracts
in an attempt to boost employment. The ET was reformed in 1984, introducing the most
important legal change of the Spanish labor market in the previous two decades, removing
most of the restrictions on non-causal ￿xed-term contracts. The main feature of the reform
is that the use of temporary contracts is no longer linked to the principle of causality, so
that they could be applied to any activity, temporary or not, and to any type of ￿rm or
worker. Furthermore, they might be signed for short periods (three, six or twelve months),
￿ring costs at termination were low (12 days of wages per year of tenure) or even zero in
some cases, and their extinction could not be appealed to labor courts. Nevertheless, an
important limitation for the use of temporary contracts under the new law was that they
could be renewed only up to three years. After this period the ￿rm should decide whether
to o⁄er the worker a permanent contract or to dismiss him.4 Importantly, the reform did
not alter the stringent dismissal regulations for permanent or inde￿nite-duration contracts.
After this reform, the number and the proportion of temporary jobs in the Spanish econ-
omy increased sharply. In Figure 2 we present the evolution of the proportion of temporary
which maintained the severance payments for fair dismissals but lowered those for unfair dismissals to 33
days of salary (up to 42 months wages), yet their utilization was limited to certain type of workers.
4Furthermore, if a ￿rm lays o⁄ a temporary worker, it must wait for a year in order to hire him again.
8employment in total employment since 1987.5 The share of temporary contracts in total
employment, which was estimated to be about 10% of total employment and 3% of man-
ufacturing employment in 1984, rose to 35 and 30 percent, respectively, in 1995, and have
remained at high levels since then.6 Spain has become by far the European country with the
highest percentage of temporary employment, with temporary contracts representing 80%
of hires in the period 1986-1990 (Bentolila and Dolado, 1994). This important increase in
temporary employment points out that ￿rms have found these contracts attractive to reduce
￿ring costs. Nevertheless, this behavior is consistent with either positive or negative employ-
ment e⁄ects of the reform. Evaluating the e⁄ects of the reform on employment and output
requires to analyze how individual ￿rms￿hiring and ￿ring decisions have changed after the
reform.
3 Data and preliminary evidence
The main data set has been taken from the database of the Balance Sheets of the Bank of
Spain (CBBE hereafter), which contains ￿rm-level annual information on the balance sheets
and other complementary information on economic variables, such as employment by type
of contract, output, physical capital and the total wage bill. The sample consists on an un-
balanced panel of non-energy manufacturing ￿rms with a public share lower than 50 percent
for the period 1982 to 1993. To obtain the ￿nal sample of 2,356 ￿rms we have eliminated
those for which some of the following variables were negative or took implausible values:
book value of capital stock, sales, gross output, total labor costs, permanent employment,
and temporary employment. Due to the fact that response is completely voluntary, largest
￿rms are over-represented in the sample. The ￿rms included in this sample represent 40%
5Unfortunately, the Spanish Labor Force Survey did not reported any information about the type of
contract before 1987. In section 3, we present descriptive evidence on the evolution of temporary employment
for the period 1982-1993 using our panel of manufacturing ￿rms from the CBBE database.
6Figure 2 shows a large disparity between the proportion of temporary worker from the Labor Force
Survey and the proportion from the CBBE. The main factor to explain this discrepancy is that CBBE over-
represents large manufacturing ￿rms, and this type of ￿rms tend to have a smaller proportion of temporary
workers. See Figure 4 below.
9of total Spanish manufacturing value added during the period. Table 1 presents the sample
distribution of ￿rms by industry and size.
The CBBE contains ￿rm-level information on the number of workers by type of contract
(temporary or permanent), and on the average duration (in weeks) of temporary contracts.
To maintain measurement consistency, number of temporary employees is calculated in an-
nual terms by multiplying the number of temporary employees along the year times the
average number of weeks worked by temporary employees and divided by 52. It is worth to
notice that, as it happens in most ￿rm-level datasets, there is not information on employment
￿ ows along the year, and therefore only net employment changes are observed. Gross output
at retail prices is calculated as total sales, plus the change in ￿nished product inventories and
other income from the production process, minus taxes derived on the production (net of
subsidies). Real output has been obtained using as de￿ ator the Retail Price Index at 3 digits
industry level. The information on the ￿rm￿ s total wage bill (which allows to calculate the
average wage rate for total employees at the ￿rm-level) is not broken down by type of con-
tract. Wage information by type of contract is available from the Spanish Wage Distribution
Survey (Distribuci￿n Salarial, DS hereinafter). However, the DS dataset is only available for
the years 1988 and 1992, and it provides only aggregate information. We describe in Section
5.1 our approach to obtain estimates of wages of permanent and temporary workers for the
whole period 1982-1993.
In Figure 3, we report the evolution of the growth rates of real output and employment
for our sample of ￿rms. The evolution of real output growth shows that the period 1982-
1993 covers an expansion, 1986-1989, and a recession 1990-1993. However, the number
and the proportion of permanent employees have monotonically decreased along the sample
period, as shown in Figure 2. After the introduction of the new regulation of temporary
contracts in November 1984, temporary employment rose signi￿cantly from 1986 to 1990
and decreased during the economic downturn from 1990 to 1993, and its share in total
employment rose from 2:89 percent in 1985 to 9:72 percent in 1993. Although the evolution
10of temporary employment in our sample keeps coherency with the aggregate series for the
overall economy, and particularly with the aggregate series for the manufacturing industry
(in fact, the correlation coe¢ cient between both series is above 90 percent), the ￿gure for
our sample is clearly much smaller than the aggregates ￿gures, which were well above 20
percent at the beginning of the nineties. This discrepancy is due to the fact that larger
companies, which are over-represented in our sample, are more prompted to use permanent
employment than small or medium ones. In Figure 4, we can see that the proportion of
temporary employment for ￿rms in our sample di⁄ers very much between large ￿rms, for
which this proportion is lower, and small and medium ￿rms.
Figure 5 presents the job creation and job destruction rates for permanent and temporary
employment using the statistics proposed by Davis and Haltiwanger (1992).7 The small job
turnover rates for permanent employment contrasts with the very high rates for temporary
employment. Furthermore, the creation and destruction rates for temporary employment
are much more correlated with the cycle than those for permanent employment. This is
evidence of how ￿ring costs can have very important e⁄ects on job turnover rates. It also
re￿ ects the fact that although the reform introduced larger ￿ exibility for new hires, it kept
the core of permanent employees una⁄ected.
Figure 6 presents the times series of the proportion of ￿rms with positive, negative and
zero annual change in permanent employment. We observe a remarkable frequency of no
adjustments in permanent employment (about 19%), which is fairly stable over the cycle,
suggesting an important persistence in permanent employment. This evidence is consistent
with the existence of lump-sum or kinked adjustment costs.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on employment and productivity for a pre-reform
period (1982-1984) and a post-reform period (1989-1992). For the sake of comparability,
we consider a common subsample of ￿rms in the two periods (389 ￿rms). The post-reform
7Our measures are based on ￿rm level data instead of plant level data as in Davis, Haltiwanger (1992)
for US. This can be a factor, in addition to the di⁄erent labor market institutions in Spain and US, that
contributes to the smaller job turnover rates that we ￿nd in our data.
11period 1989-1992 has been also selected for comparability reasons: i.e., as shown in the ￿rst
row of Table 2, the cross-sectional distributions of the rates of growth in real output are very
similar in 1982-1984 and 1989-1992. From this comparison we can establish some interesting
facts. The cross-sectional distribution of employment growth has the same median in the two
periods, but it is signi￿cantly more disperse after the reform. The proportion of temporary
employment increases, and as result of this there is a small increase in total employment
despite a reduction in permanent employment takes place. Interestingly, we can see that
￿rm productivity, as measured by the sales to wage bill ratio, goes down after the reform.
Of course, these changes could be, or not, consequence of the labor market reform. To obtain
more robust measures of the e⁄ects of the reform, we estimate a structural model.
4 Model
4.1 Basic assumptions
Consider an economy with two types of labor contracts: ￿xed-term and inde￿nite-duration
contracts. We denote employees as temporary or permanent depending on whether they
enjoy a ￿xed-term or an inde￿nite-duration contract, respectively. We assume that a ￿xed-
term contract lasts only one period (year). In principle, the only exogenous feature that
distinguishes a permanent and a temporary contract lies in the dismissal costs. Firms are
enforced by law to pay a severance to each dismissed permanent worker, but temporary
workers are not entitled to any compensation upon dismissal. Although dismissal costs
appear as the only exogenous di⁄erence between these two contract types, they can generate,
endogenously, further di⁄erences between workers. Particularly, two major di⁄erences are
expected to appear. On the one hand, incentives to invest in ￿rm-speci￿c human capital are
stronger for workers with inde￿nite-term contracts than for those with ￿xed-term contracts.
This fact might create a productivity gap between permanent and temporary workers. On
the other hand, the higher costs of dismissals will place permanent workers in a better
bargaining position within the ￿rm. This fact might induce a wage gap between permanent
12and temporary workers. We incorporate these di⁄erential features in our model, yet we take
them as exogenous for the sake of simplicity.
Firms produce a homogeneous good using labor as the only variable input, and sell their
output in a competitive market.8 Every period t, the ￿rm chooses the amounts of permanent






where Et is the conditional expectation function given the information up to period t, ￿t
denotes pro￿ts at period t, and ￿ 2 (0;1) is the discount factor. Current pro￿ts, measured
in output units, are:
￿t = Yt ￿ WBt ￿ ACt + ￿t, (1)
where Yt is real output, WBt is the wage bill, ACt represents labor adjustment costs, and
the term ￿t contains other components of current pro￿t which are observable to the ￿rm but
unobservable to the econometrician. Physical capital is treated as a component of the ￿rm
idiosyncratic shock and it is assumed to follow an exogenous process.
The production technology is described by the production function
Yt = (L
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t represent the corresponding amounts of ￿rm￿ s permanent and temporary
workers; ￿L 2 (0;1) and ￿ 2 (0;1) are parameters; and ￿t is an exogenous and idiosyncratic
productivity shock. The parameter ￿ measures the productivity of temporary workers with
respect to permanent workers. The productivity shock is assumed to follow a ￿rst-order
Markov process with transition probability function f￿(￿t+1j￿t).




t , where W T
t and W P
t are the wages of temporary
and permanent workers, respectively. The wage of temporary workers is determined at the
market level, and it is the same for all ￿rms operating in the market. However, the wage
of permanent workers is ￿rm-speci￿c (e.g., internal labor market, rent-sharing). The pair of
8Alternatively, we may consider that ￿rms compete in monopolistic product markets with isoelastic
demand curves. In that setting, our production function should be re-interpreted as a revenue function, and
its parameters are a combination of technological parameters and the elasticity of demand.
13wages Wt = (W T
t ;W P
t ) follows a ￿rst-order Markov process with transition probability func-
tion fW(Wt+1jWt). Section 5.1 presents our speci￿cation assumptions on the joint dynamics
of the wages of permanent and temporary workers.
The speci￿cation of labor adjustment costs, de￿ned in terms of net employment changes,
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parameters. The ￿rst two summands refer to hiring and ￿ring costs of temporary workers.
The third and fourth terms are the adjustment costs for hiring and ￿ring permanent workers,
respectively.
In this model, workers within the same ￿rm and with the same contract type are identi-
cal. Therefore, a ￿rm can hire or ￿re permanent (temporary) workers, but it is never optimal
to hire and ￿re simultaneously workers with the same type of contract. Of course, it can be
optimal to hire permanent (temporary) workers and ￿re simultaneously temporary (perma-
nent) ones. This said, it is straightforward to see that optimal decisions on employment can
be expressed in terms of net employment change.
The ￿rm chooses employment changes so as to maximize its expected intertemporal pro￿t.
We consider a discrete choice model such that the set of possible values of (￿LP
t ;￿LT
t ) is
discrete and ￿nite. The main reason why we consider a discrete model is that there is
much lumpiness in these employment decisions. In our data, the frequency of zeroes in
annual employment changes is 18.8% for permanent employment and 49.1% for temporary
employment. Furthermore, the frequency of employment changes within -5 and +5 workers
is 65.5% for permanent labor and 80.4% for temporary labor. Let D be the ￿nite set of
possible discrete values for (￿LP
t ;￿LT
t ).
The component of current pro￿ts that is unobservable from the point of view of the




















￿P; ￿T and ￿0 are parameters. We use ￿" to represent the vector (￿P;￿T;￿0)0. "P
t and
"T
t are mutually independent standard normal random variables which are independently
distributed over time and across ￿rms. For every possible pair of discrete values (j;k) 2 D,
the variable "0
t(j;k) is a logit error which is independently and identically distributed over




t(k;j) : (k;j) 2 Dg. This combination of normal errors and logit
errors resembles the speci￿cation in the mixed (or random coe¢ cients) multinomial logit





that unobservables are correlated across choice alternatives. Hence, the model does not hold
the property of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, which is a well known limitation of
the standard multinomial logit model. Nevertheless, the model retains some features of the
multinomial logit, which facilitates estimation and ensures good properties of the maximum
likelihood estimator.9
Every period, the ￿rm has perfect knowledge about its stocks of permanent and tem-
porary labor, wages, and the realized values of productivity and cost shocks, but it has
uncertainty about the future values of these shocks. Let xt ￿ (LP
t￿1;LT
t￿1;Wt;￿t) be the
vector of state variables at period t, excluding "t. And let dt be a vector of two categorical
variables representing the corresponding decisions (￿LP
t ;￿LT
t ). The pro￿t function can be
written as:
￿t = z (dt;xt) ￿ + ￿(dt;"t) (5)




















, and z (dt;xt) is a 1 ￿ 9
9The model contains as particular cases the standard multinomial logit, as ￿P = ￿T = 0, and the bivariate
ordered probit, as ￿0 = 0.
15vector with corresponding elements
0
@
Yt ￿ WBt ; 1(￿LT
t > 0) ; 1(￿LT
t > 0)￿LT
t ; 1(￿LT
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We can represent the ￿rm￿ s decision problem using the Bellman equation:
V (xt;"t) = max
dt2D
"




V (xt+1;"t+1) f"(d"t+1) fx(xt+1jxt;dt)
#
(7)
where f" is the density function of "t, and the transition of the vector of state variables xt
is:
fx(xt+1jxt;dt) = 1fLt = Lt￿1 + ￿Ltg f￿(￿t+1j￿t) fW(Wt+1jWt) (8)
4.2 Probabilistic representation of ￿rms￿employment decisions
In this section, we follow Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002) to represent the optimal solution
of the previous dynamic labor demand model as the unique ￿xed point of a mapping in
probabilistic space. Let X be the space of possible values of xt. A ￿rm￿ s optimal behavior can
be represented using a vector of optimal choice probabilities P = fP(djx) : (d;x) 2 D￿Xg,
where P(djx) is the probability that the optimal decision at period t is d conditional on the
value of xt being x. De￿ne also ￿ as the vector of parameters that characterize the transition
probabilities f￿ and fW. Following Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002), we can obtain the vector
P as the unique ￿xed point of a contraction mapping in the space of conditional choice
probabilities: P = ￿￿;￿";￿(P), where ￿￿;￿";￿(:) is the mapping. Under our assumptions on





























16￿ is the pdf of the standard normal. ￿LP(d) and ￿LT(d) represent the values for the
change in permanent and in temporary employment, respectively, under choice alternative
d. Z￿;P (d;x) is a 1 ￿ 9 vector with the present value of the stream of current and future
values of the vector z (:;:) conditional on the current value of (dt;xt) being (d;x) and under
the assumption that the ￿rm will behave in the future according to the choice probabilities
in P. For instance, the ￿rst element of the vector Z￿;P (d;x) is the present value of output
minus wage bill. In a similar manner, e￿;P (d;x) is a scalar containing the present value of
the stream of future realizations of ￿(dt+j;"t+j) associated with optimal future choices. More
formally, we have that:
























t+j represents the optimal employment decision j periods ahead under the assumption
that the probabilities in P are the ones associated with the optimal decision rule. It is
important to emphasize that to obtain the values Z￿;P (d;x) and e￿;P (d;x) we only need to
know the probabilities P, the parameters ￿, and the discount factor ￿.
In what follows, we outline the procedure to calculate the values of Z￿;P (d;x) and
e￿;P (d;x), which is explained in depth by Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002, 2009). Let
W P
z (x)￿ + W P
e (x) be the expected discounted utility of behaving according to choice prob-
abilities P from current period t and into the in￿nite future when xt = x. Consider that
the space of state variables X is discrete. De￿ne the matrix WP
z ￿ fW P
z (x) : x 2 Xg
and the vector WP
e ￿ fW P
e (x) : x 2 Xg. It can be shown that WP
z is the unique so-
lution of the recursive equation WP
z =
P
d2D P(d) ￿ fz(d)+￿ Fx(d) WP
z g, where P(d) is
the column vector of choice probabilities fP(djx) : x 2 Xg; z(d) is the matrix fz(d;x) :
x 2 Xg; Fx(d) is a transition probability matrix with elements fx(xt+1jxt;d); and ￿ is the
element-by-element product. Likewise, WP




d2D P(d)￿feP(d)+￿ Fx(d) WP
z g where eP(d) is the vector feP(d;x) : x 2 Xg and
eP(d;x) ￿ E(￿(d￿
t;"t)jd￿
t = d;xt = x), which is a known function of the choice probabilities
P(djx). The objects WP
z and WP
e can be computed by successive approximations, iterating
on the contraction mappings that implicitly de￿ne them.10
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002) derive the properties of the contraction mapping ￿￿;￿";￿.
For a given vector of structural parameters (￿;￿";￿) we can use this mapping to obtain
the vector of optimal choice probabilities P. This mapping is also an important component
in the maximum likelihood estimation of (￿;￿") using the nested procedure proposed by
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002). We describe this procedure in section 5.3.
4.3 Assumptions for Policy Evaluation
Our main interest is to evaluate the e⁄ects of the 1984 labor market reform on employment
and productivity in the Spanish manufacturing industry, using our longitudinal sample of
Spanish ￿rms. The reform extended the use of temporary contracts to any activity, tempo-
rary or not, and reduced ￿ring costs for these contracts from 45 days to 12 days of wages per
year of tenure. The new regulation applied to every type of ￿rms and workers, regardless of
size, industry, occupation, etc. Our approach for evaluating the e⁄ects of this reform exploits
sample information before and after the policy change, together with the structure of our
model and the characteristics of the reform. This section describes our evaluation approach
and its identi￿cation assumptions.
Some identi￿cation assumptions are necessary to establish that the pre-reform and the
post-reform sample periods correspond to the equilibria with the old and the new policies,
respectively. This subsection discusses these assumptions.
a) Non anticipation of the reform. If agents would have anticipated the policy change, their
10Note that the mappings that implicitly de￿ne WP
z and WP
e are linear in these objects. Therefore, there is
a closed form expression for WP
z and for WP





z(a). When the number of cells in X is small enough, matrix inversion algorithms may be preferable to
successive approximations. The matrix (I ￿ ￿F)￿1 can also be approximated using the series I + ￿F +
￿
2F2 + ::: + ￿
KFK, with K large enough. This can be easier than matrix inversion. More generally, this
inverse matrix can be obtained iterating in A (succesive approximations) in the mapping A = I + ￿F A.
18behavior before the reform would not represent their optimal decisions if the reform would
not have taken place. For instance, some ￿rms willing to hire in 1983 or 1984 had preferred to
postpone hiring and ￿ring decisions until 1985 in order to use the new type of labor contract.
Departures from this assumption might bias our estimates of labor adjustment costs for the
pre-reform period. Since our sample covers only three years before the policy change, there
is not very much we can do to control for this potential source of bias.
b) Instantaneous learning about the features of the new policy. Looking at our data, there
is clear evidence that a long transition period to the new steady-state took place after
the reform. In particular, the proportion of temporary employment increased almost every
year between 1984 and 1993, and was kept at high levels since then (see Figure 2). Such
transition period could be explained by the existence of large ￿ring costs for permanent
workers. However, another reason that might have contributed to this long transition, and
which is not considered in our model, is that the ￿rm learning process about the features of
the new policy rule were slow. Since our model assumes instantaneous learning, it rules out
this alternative explanation. The fact that the number of new temporary contracts exerted
a large increase shortly after the reform, in 1985, seems to support our assumption.11
c) Policy-related and policy-invariant parameters. The reform entailed a change in the dis-
missal costs of temporary workers, ￿
T
F. Hiring costs of temporary workers, ￿
T
H, their relative
productivity, ￿, and hiring costs of permanent workers may have been a⁄ected by the reform






H and ￿ are policy related parameters. It seems plausible that
the technological parameter ￿L, ￿ring costs of permanent workers, ￿
P
F, and the stochastic
process of the productivity shock are policy invariant parameters. In an equilibrium frame-
work, the stochastic process of wages may be a⁄ected by this reform. This is consistent with
the time series of wages for permanent and temporary workers in ￿gure 7. Our estimation
11It is also important to emphasize that our assumption of instantaneous learning does not imply that
the new steady-state was reached instantaneously after the reform. Our econometric approach assumes that
the structural equations (i.e., the production function, the wage equation, and the dynamic labor demand
functions) are stable within the pre-reform period and within the post-reform period. This assumption is
fully consistent with the evidence on long transition periods for some endogenous variables.
19of the econometric model takes into account this possibility. However, our model is of par-
tial equilibrium and our policy evaluation (i.e., counterfactual experiments) provides partial
equilibrium e⁄ects.
5 Estimation of the model
We have a panel dataset with ￿rm-level, annual-frequency information on output, employ-
ment by type of contract, physical capital, investment, and wage bill: fYit;LT
it;LP
it;Kit;Iit;WBit :
i = 1;:::;N; t = 1;:::;Tig. Our econometric model consists on the production function,
the stochastic processes for the productivity shock and wages, and the dynamic model for
the demand of permanent and temporary labor. The vector of structural parameters is
f￿L;￿;￿;￿";￿;￿g, where ￿ is (as de￿ned in previous section) the vector of adjustment costs
parameters, and ￿ is the vector of parameters in the transition probabilities of the state
variables. We estimate these parameters in two steps. In a ￿rst step, we estimate f￿L;￿;￿g
from the production function and transition data. In a second step, we estimate ￿ and ￿" by
maximum likelihood in the dynamic labor demand model. Before describing our estimation
methods and results, we undertake the estimation of wages by type of contract.
5.1 Estimation of wages
As we mentioned in Section 3, our sample information on the ￿rm￿ s total wage bill is not





it. Given our assumption that the wage of temporary workers is the same for



















it. But we do not have data on W T
t and W P
it , at least for every
year in our sample period and at the ￿rm-level. Therefore, W T
t and W P
it are unobservables for
us. If the wage of permanent workers were mean independent of the temporary-to-permanent
ratio, LT
it=LP
it, we could estimate the value W T




it (interacted with time dummies). Moreover, the residual of that regression would
be a consistent estimator of the wage of permanent workers at the ￿rm level. However,
such estimate of W T
t will be a⁄ected by an upward endogeneity bias if, as we expect, the
temporary-to-permanent ratio is positively correlated with the wage of permanent workers.
To control for this bias, we consider a ￿xed-e⁄ect or within-￿rms estimator. That is, we
assume that the wage of permanent workers is:
W
P
it = ￿i + ￿t + uit (13)
where ￿i is a ￿rm ￿xed-e⁄ect; ￿t is an aggregate e⁄ect; and uit is a shock assumed to be
uncorrelated with the temporary-to-permanent ratio. Under this assumption, the ￿xed-
e⁄ects estimator provides consistent estimates of W T
t .
Figure 7 presents the time series of our ￿xed e⁄ect estimates for the average wages of
permanent and temporary workers. According to our estimates, the wage di⁄erential between
contracts was small before the reform but it has widened very importantly after 1984. This
result is consistent with the evidence provided by Bentolila and Dolado (1994). As argued
by these authors, a possible explanation for this wage di⁄erential is that the own existence of
temporary contracts increased the job security and the wage bargaining power of permanent
workers.
5.2 Estimation of the production function
The speci￿cation of the production function in equation (2) treats physical capital as a
component of the productivity shock ￿it. This is a convenient assumption to reduce the
dimensionality of decision and state spaces. Though we maintain this assumption throughout
the paper, in the estimation of the production function we incorporate explicitly physical
capital and estimate the technological parameter associated with this input. Looking at this
estimate is a way of checking for the validity of the speci￿cation and for the economic sense of
the estimation results. We consider a Cobb-Douglas production function in terms of physical
21capital and production-equivalent units of labor. The production function in logarithms is:
lnYit = ￿K lnKit + ￿L ln(L
P
it + ￿ L
T
it) + !it (14)
where Kit is the installed capital at the beginning of year t; !it is the "pure" productivity
shock such that ￿it = ￿K lnKit + !it.
It is well known that the OLS estimation of this equation may su⁄er of endogeneity
bias because of the correlation between the inputs and the unobservable productivity shock.
Furthermore, if the productivity shock is serially correlated, lagged values of inputs and
output are also correlated with the unobservables, and therefore they cannot be used as
instruments. Using input prices (e.g., wages) as instruments is also problematic. Some input
prices do not have variability at the ￿rm level (e.g., the wage of temporary workers, or the
price of capital), and those prices that do have that variability are very suspicious of being
correlated with ￿rm￿ s productivity (e.g., the wage of permanent workers).
Our identi￿cation of the parameters in the production function is based on the control
function approach proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996). Our application of this method is in
the spirit of the extension proposed by Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006). Investment in
physical capital is a function of the state variables (Kit;LP
i;t￿1;LT
i;t￿1;Ct;!it), where Ct repre-
sents input prices, and of some shocks ￿it which are assumed to be independent of the other
state variables (Kit;LP
i;t￿1;LT
i;t￿1;Ct;!it;"it). Let Iit = g(Kit;LP
i;t￿1;LT
i;t￿1;Ct;!it;￿it) be the
optimal decision rule for investment. Since this function g is strictly increasing in the produc-
tivity shock !it, there is an inverse function such that !it = g￿1(Iit;Kit;LP
i;t￿1;LT
i;t￿1;Ct;￿it).











it is the remaining part of !it. This decompo-
sition has two important features. First, !e
it only depends on observable variables. And
second, ￿￿






, and also of
LP
it and LT
it. Therefore, we can write the production function as,
lnYit = ￿L ln(L
P








it = ￿K lnKit + !e
it. Note that ￿e
it is a smooth function of (Iit;Kit;LP
i;t￿1;LT
i;t￿1;Ct).
We can control for this term by including a high order polynomial in these observable vari-
ables. The key identi￿cation assumption is that there are i.i.d. shocks "it and ￿it a⁄ecting
current employment and investment, respectively, which are mutually independent. Under
this assumption, we can use current investment to control for the endogenous part of the
productivity shock !it, and still we have some variability left in the current employment
variables LP
it and LT
it, to identify ￿L and ￿.
Once we have estimated ￿L and ￿, we can exploit the assumption on the Markov process
of !it to estimate ￿K. First, we obtain estimates of ￿it as the residuals lnYit￿b ￿L ln(LP
it+b ￿LT
it).
According to the model, ￿it = ￿K lnKit + !it. Assuming that !it follows an AR(1) process:
!it = ￿! !i;t￿1 + ait with ait ￿ iid(0;￿2
a), we have that
￿
￿it ￿ ￿! ￿i;t￿1
￿
= ￿K (lnKit ￿ ￿! lnKi;t￿1) + ait (16)
Since the innovation ait is independent of ￿i;t￿1, lnKit and lnKi;t￿1, we can estimate ￿K and
￿! using nonlinear least squares.
In Table 3, we present our estimates of the production function parameters. For the sake
of comparison, we report estimates using both the Olley-Pakes method and the (inconsistent)
nonlinear least squares estimator. All the estimations include time dummies and 20 industry
dummies. The control function ￿e
it includes all the terms of a second order polynomial in
(Iit;Kit;LP
i;t￿1;LT
i;t￿1) and interactions of these terms with time dummies, what entails a
total of 164 regressors. The parameters ￿, ￿! and ￿a are allowed to change between the
pre-reform and the post-reform period. However, whereas a change in ￿ might be attributed
to the reform, changes in ￿! or in ￿a might not. Comparing the two reported estimates, both
the magnitudes and the qualitative results are fairly similar, the major di⁄erences concerning
the ￿ parameter before the reform.
The point estimates imply some decreasing returns to scale, though the hypothesis of
constant returns to scale cannot be rejected under typical signi￿cance levels. The most
interesting result in this table is the post-reform increase in the relative e¢ ciency of tem-
23porary labor. While this input was just half as e¢ cient as permanent labor before 1984,
it has become almost as e¢ cient after the reform. A possible explanation for this result is
that adverse selection was a more serious problem for temporary labor in the pre-reform
period. However, we should be cautious to attribute this parameter change entirely to the
reform. For instance, young workers in Spain during this period were signi￿cantly more ed-
ucated than older cohorts, and they have also accounted for a large proportion of temporary
contracts. The estimates of the parameters ￿! and ￿a before and after the reform suggest
small reductions in the persistence of the productivity shock and in the variability of the
innovation.
5.3 Estimation of the dynamic labor demand model
We estimate the dynamic labor demand model using the Nested Pseudo Likelihood (NPL)
algorithm proposed by Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002). The NPL is a procedure to estimate
discrete choice dynamic programming models that, in the context of single-agent models,
provides the maximum likelihood estimator of the structural parameters. We provide here
a description of this procedure in the context of our model. In this section, we treat the
variables W T
t , W P
it and ￿it as observable to the researcher. These variables, in fact, have
been consistently estimated in a ￿rst step, and therefore we actually observe the estimated
values ^ W T
t , ^ W P
it and ^ ￿it. (For notational convenience, we omit the ￿ hats￿ ). The fact that the
estimated values include estimation error does not a⁄ect the consistency of our estimator of
￿, though it a⁄ects its asymptotic variance.
Let P0(ditjxit) be the true distribution of employment changes, dit ￿ f￿LP
it;￿LT
itg, con-
ditional on the state variables, xit ￿ (LP
it￿1;LT
it￿1;Wt;￿it), in the population of our study.







where ￿￿;￿";￿(P)(djx) is the mapping described by eq. (9).
24Let ^ P0 be a nonparametric estimator of the set of conditional choice probabilities in P0.
And let ^ ￿ be an estimator of the parameters in the transition probability functions of wages
and the productivity shock. Given these estimates, we can calculate the values Z^ ￿;^ P0 (d;xit)
and e^ ￿;^ P0 (d;xit) using the recursive method that we described in section 4.2. Therefore, given
Z^ ￿;^ P0 (d;xit) and e^ ￿;^ P0 (d;xit), the function Q(￿;￿"; ^ ￿; ^ P0) is the log-likelihood of a random-







.12 Given this likelihood, we can estimate the parameters ￿,
￿0, ￿P, and ￿T. Note that these parameters are separately identi￿ed from ￿=￿0, ￿T=￿0, and
￿P=￿0 because the ￿rst element of ￿, which is associated with the value of output minus the
wage bill, is equal to 1. The estimator of (￿;￿") that maximizes Q(￿;￿"; ^ ￿; ^ P0) is consistent
and asymptotically equivalent to the maximum likelihood estimator (see Proposition 4 in
Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2002). Furthermore, as shown by Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002),
asymptotic standard errors need not be corrected for the estimation errors in ^ P0. A recursive
extension of this two-step method returns the (conditional) maximum likelihood estimator
of (￿;￿"). The main computational and econometric issues in this estimation procedure
concerns the computation of the values Z^ ￿;^ P0 (d;xit) and e^ ￿;^ P0 (d;xit).
(a) Discretization of employment changes (decision variable) and of employment levels (en-
dogenous state variables). As mentioned above, the main reason why we consider a discrete
model is that there is signi￿cant lumpiness in employment changes. For more than 57% of
the ￿rm-year observations in the sample, the annual change in temporary and permanent
employment is between ￿5 and +5 workers, and more than 72% of the observations lie
between ￿10 and +10 workers. Table 4 presents the empirical distribution of employment
changes before and after the reform. We can see that a small number of discrete values
account for a large proportion of observations of employment changes. However, though the
distribution of employment changes is discrete and lumpy, it also has long tails. We would
12We calculate numerically the double integral in the probability function ￿￿;￿";￿(P)(djx). More specif-
ically, we use the Gauss-Legendre quadrature method provided by the command intquad2 in the GAUSS
software package.
25need a support with too many values to account for more than 90% of the sample values
of this variable. Similarly, there is a trade-o⁄ in the discretization of the endogenous state
variables LP
it￿1 and LT
it￿1. A ￿ner discretization can capture more sample variation of the
variables, but it also increases the cost of computing the present values Z^ ￿;^ P0 and e^ ￿;^ P0.13




it￿1 should be consistent with each other.
Taking into account these issues, we consider the following approach. De￿ne the variable
‘
j
it ￿ 100 ￿ (L
j
it=￿ Li), where ￿ Li is the sample mean of total employment LP
it + LT
it for ￿rm i.
Therefore, ‘
j
it represents the percentage of current employment (type j) relative to the ￿rm
speci￿c mean. De￿ne also d
j
it ￿ 100 ￿ (￿L
j
it=￿ Li), that measures the percentage of current








We discretize the space of dP
it (and dT
it) in the set of integer numbers multiples of 2 between
￿20 and +20. Note that dP
it = 0 and dT
it = 0 represents actual zeros in employment change.14
The discretized space for ‘P
it (‘T
it) is the set of integer numbers multiples of 2 between 40 and
120 (between 0 and 40). Figure 8 presents the histograms of the discretized values of the
decision variables dP
it and dT
it, and of the state variables ‘P
it and ‘T
it.
(b) Discretization of exogenous state variables. We follow Tauchen (1986) and Tauchen and
Hussey (1991) to choose the discretization grid of the exogenous state variables (W T
t ,W P
it ;￿it).
For each of these variables, we estimate an AR(1) process and follow Tauchen-Hussey proce-
dure. However, for the state variables (W P
it ;￿it) we apply a di⁄erent discretization for each
individual ￿rm. That is, the discretization applies to the variables in deviations with respect
to their ￿rm-speci￿c means: Wit ￿ ￿ Wi and ￿it ￿ ￿ ￿i. By using ￿rm-speci￿c discretizations,
we can capture most of the time-series variability of the state variables without having to
consider too many grid points. The total number of cells in the discretized state space X
13As explained in section 4.2, to obtain these present values we have to solve for WP




d2D P(d) ￿ fz(d)+￿ Fx(d) WP
z g. The dimension of this system of equations is the
number of cells in the state space X.
14Values greater (lower) than zero but lower than 2 (greater than ￿2) are censored at 2 (￿2).
26is 6;888 (i.e., 41 for permanent employment, 21 for temporary employment, 2 for wage of
temporaries, 2 for wage of permanents, and 2 for the productivity shock).
In our computation of the inclusive values Z^ ￿;^ P0 and e^ ￿;^ P0, there are a technical issue
and a simplifying assumption, which deserve to be explained. First, given our de￿nition of
the state variables in deviations with respect to ￿rm-speci￿c means, the matrix WP
z and the
vector WP
e are ￿rm-speci￿c, and they should be calculated on a ￿rm-by-￿rm basis. This
means that we have to solve 2;356 systems of linear equations, each with a dimension of
6;888 variables. Note that, for the implementation of our procedure, we do not need to
store in memory the 2;356 matrices WP
z and vectors WP
e . We only need to store in memory
one at a time. Second, for the calculation of e^ ￿;^ P0 we have used the simplifying assumption
that the future values of "P and "T are equal to their expected values. Therefore, the only
component in e^ ￿;^ P0 is the one that comes from the expectation of the future extreme value
error "0.
(c) Initial estimates of conditional choice probabilities. We have estimated a multinomial
logit with dependent variable dit = (dP
it;dT
it), using as explanatory variables the terms of a





To estimate our dynamic labor demand model, we have considered alternative speci￿ca-
tions of the unobservables, including the pure conditional logit without random coe¢ cients
and di⁄erent random-coe¢ cient models, and alternative assumptions on the variances of the
"￿ s, including homoscedasticity and heteroscedasticity. The time-discount factor is ￿xed at
￿ = 0:95. The choice of our most-preferred speci￿cation has been based on two criteria.
First, the sign and magnitude of the estimated parameters should have economic sense. Sec-
ond, the model should provide a reasonable ￿t for aggregate statistics such as the aggregate
time path of the proportion of temporary workers, the percentage of zeroes in the distribu-
tion of employment changes, the average job turnover rates, and the cross-sectional variance
of employment levels.
Following these criteria, our favorite speci￿cation is a model where labor adjustment
27costs (￿xed, linear and quadratic) and the standard deviation of the unobservable "0s are
proportional to the ￿rm-speci￿c mean of the salary-per-worker. For instance, the linear cost
of ￿ring permanent workers for ￿rm i is ￿
P
F1i = ~ ￿
P
F1 ￿ Wi, where ~ ￿
P
F1 is the same parameter
for every ￿rm and ￿ Wi is ￿rm i0s mean salary per worker, i.e., ￿ Wi = (1=Ti)
PTi
t=1 Wit. The
same speci￿cation applies to the other ￿ parameters in labor adjustment costs. Similarly, the
variances of the unobservables are var("P
it) = ￿2
P ￿ W 2
i , var("T
it) = ￿2
T ￿ W 2




i . It is important to note that the model with random coe¢ cients provides both more
sensible results and better ￿t that the pure conditional logit model. For instance, under
the conditional logit model, the estimates of some lump-sum adjustment costs are negative
and signi￿cant, and most quadratic adjustment costs are unrealistically large. Besides, such
model fails to ￿t the thick tails in the empirical distribution of employment changes.
Table 5 presents the estimates of the dynamic labor demand model for our preferred
speci￿cation. We have estimated the model for three sub-periods: the pre-reform period
1983-1984, and the post-reform periods 1985-1988, and 1989-1992. Table 6 provides measures
of goodness of ￿t of the estimated model. The ￿t of the estimated model, for the three sample
periods, to the di⁄erent aggregate statistics, is very good, except for the proportion of zeros
in the change of temporary employment. In this latter case, the model under-estimates such
proportion, yet the degree of underestimation is similar for the three sample periods.
Regarding adjustment costs, the linear components reveal as the most important ones for
both contract types, either for hiring or for ￿ring. The quadratic components are very small
and non signi￿cant. The ￿xed components are generally small, except the ￿xed cost of ￿ring
permanent workers in the three periods, and the ￿xed cost of hiring temporary workers in
the pre-reform period.
In the case of linear hiring components, the hiring costs per worker are fairly similar for
both contract types, ranging between 10 and 18% of a worker￿ s annual salary. Interestingly,
linear hiring costs for both contract types seem to experience a decline after the reform. This
fact may be pointing out that the screening costs of workers are lowered after the reform.
28In the case of temporary workers, most of new contracts become temporary contracts after
the reform, so that the pool of candidates for a job under a temporary contracts is hugely
widened. In the case of permanent workers, hiring a permanent worker after the reform
means, typically, promoting a temporary worker who was already in the ￿rm to a permanent
position. Such promotion may be less expensive than the recruitment of an outsider.
The linear ￿ring costs for permanent workers amount between 46% and 53% of a worker￿ s
annual salary, and are fairly similar between the pre-reform and the post-reform periods.
Linear ￿ring costs for temporary workers, on the other hand, are relatively small (between
4% and 10%), showing a decline between the pre-reform and the post-reform periods, when
they become non signi￿cant.
Comparing the estimated adjustment cost components before and after the reform, we
￿nd several signi￿cant reductions in the post-reform period. Many of them a⁄ected the
structure of adjustment cost for temporary employment: in particular, its ￿xed and linear
components of both hiring and ￿ring costs were reduced. The most outstanding drop corre-
sponded to ￿xed hiring costs for temporary employment. This signi￿cant drop in the ￿xed
cost of hiring temporary workers contributes to explain why the proportion of ￿rms using
temporary workers increased from 45% in 1984 to 75% in 1993. The drop in the linear costs
of hiring and ￿ring temporaries cannot explain alone the rise of temporary employment. Ac-
cording to our estimates, it seems as if there were other administrative ￿xed costs associated
with hiring temporary workers before the reform. Concerning permanent employment, the
linear hiring and ￿ring costs were reduced after the reform. Finally, the parameters related
with the dispersion of the unobservable shocks are all signi￿cantly positive, and keep stable
over time.
From our estimation of the structural equations, the overall picture that appears on the
e⁄ects of the reform is the following: (1) it has made it cheaper to hire and ￿re temporary
workers, both at the intensive and at the extensive margin; (2) it has reduced the cost of hir-
ing permanent workers, probably because promoting an insider (temporary) to a permanent
29position is less expensive than recruiting an outsider; and (3) the productivity of tempo-
rary workers has become closer to the one of permanents; and (4) the wage-gap between
permanent and temporary workers has widened after the reform.
6 Policy evaluation
We use the estimated model to evaluate the e⁄ects, on employment, job turnover, produc-
tivity and ￿rms￿value, of the introduction of temporary contracts. We also compare such
e⁄ects with those associated with a counterfactual policy that halves linear-￿ring costs for
all type of workers. To implement these policy evaluations, we select the ￿rms active in the
sample in 1984. For this group of ￿rms, we solve for the value function and the optimal
decision rule in three dynamic programming models: a "pre-reform" model, a "post-reform"
model, and a counterfactual model. For the three models, real wages are assumed to be
constant at their 1984 levels (i.e., the policy evaluation considers partial equilibrium e⁄ects),
and the stochastic process of the productivity shock is the one for the period 1983-1984. In
the pre-reform model, the value of the other structural parameters are the ones estimated
for the period 1983-1984. For the post-reform model, the structural parameters are the es-
timates for the period 1989-1992. Finally, for the counterfactual model, we ￿x the values of





are reduced by half: i.e., the counterfactual values of ￿
P
F1;i= ￿ Wi and ￿
T
F1;i= ￿ Wi are 0:257 and
0:049, respectively. For each model, we calculate the steady-state distribution of the state
variables and use this distribution to obtain the mean values of employment, output, etc.
Table 7 presents the results of these experiments. The introduction of temporary con-
tracts had important positive e⁄ects on total employment (a 3:5% increase) and job turnover.
The increase in total employment is associated with a strong substitution of permanent by
temporary workers: the proportion of temporary workers rises from 3:8% to 16:2%. Per-
manent employment declines by 10%. The positive e⁄ects on productivity (0:7%) and the
value of ￿rms (1:2%) are small. These e⁄ects contrast substantially with the ones of the
30counterfactual reform. While the e⁄ects on total employment are alike (a 4:1% increase),
the counterfactual reform had improved permanent employment (6:6% increase), labor pro-
ductivity (1:9% increase), and the value of ￿rms (4:8%). Furthermore, the proportion of
temporary employment becomes almost null (1:3%).
7 Concluding remarks
Using panel data of Spanish manufacturing ￿rms, we have estimated a dynamic labor de-
mand model and evaluated the e⁄ects of a reform that introduced temporary contracts in
1984. The structural model allows for a rich speci￿cation of labor adjustment costs, includ-
ing ￿xed, linear and quadratic components, and unobserved ￿rm-heterogeneity (i.e., random
coe¢ cients). The model with random-coe¢ cients provides a better ￿t and more sensible re-
sults that a simpler conditional logit model. Our estimation results show signi￿cant changes
in structural parameters after the reform. Hiring and ￿ring temporary workers has become
less expensive, both at the intensive and at the extensive margins, and the cost of hiring
permanent workers has declined. Based on the estimated model, we present counterfactual
experiments to evaluate the e⁄ects of the reform. The reform had important e⁄ects on
employment and job turnover, but modest e⁄ects on productivity and value of ￿rms. How-
ever, we also ￿nd that a counterfactual policy that halved ￿ring costs for both contracts has
similar e⁄ects on total employment, but the positive e⁄ects on output, value of ￿rms, and
permanent employment are much stronger.
Between 1984 and 1997, the labor market regulations remained essentially unchanged.
Since 1997, several reforms of labor market regulations have been undertaken. Most of
them have been aimed at limiting the widespread use of temporary contracts, and boost the
use of permanent contracts through lower social security and termination costs. The rules
to limit temporary contract have proved ine⁄ective, to the extent that the proportion of
temporary workers have remained stable around 30% for the total economy (with a slightly
lower incidence in manufacturing). With regard to the reduction in severance payments
31for permanent contracts, they have been limited to new contracts of certain collectives of
workers, while the severance payments for existing contracts and for many new permanent
contracts have remained unchanged. The behavior of the Spanish labor market, therefore,
has not lived substantial changes since the 1984 reform, and features Spain nowadays as the
OECD country with the highest proportion of temporary employment.
The duality of the Spanish labor market has been strengthened in the last two decades, so
that 30% of the working people, those with temporary contracts, bear most of employment
rotation, to the extent that all the ￿ exibility of the labor market is provided by them. The
incidence of these contracts di⁄ers very much by worker characteristics, a⁄ecting more to
female, young, and less educated people, as well as people with long unemployment episodes.
We have seen that the introduction of these contracts led to an increase in the employment
level, but at the expense of a lower productivity per worker. The lack of ￿rm-speci￿c human
capital investment may be behind this fact. Precisely, the counterfactual reform that we
have posed, illustrates this negative aspect of temporary contracts. We have seen that an
alternative reform reducing all ￿ring costs by 50% would provide a similar employment
level, yet with a low proportion of temporary employment, and as a consequence, a higher
productivity per worker than under the current setting. The current regulations of the
Spanish labor market fails to provide incentives for ￿rm-speci￿c human capital investment.
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36Table 1
Distribution of ￿rms by 2-digit industry and by size
Unbalanced panel 1982-1993 (2356 ￿rms)
Small Med1 Med 2 Large Total
Iron, steel Abs. freq. 5 8 10 22 45
and metal % by ind. 11.11 17.78 22.22 48.89 100.00
(22) % by size 1.29 0.94 1.73 4.10 1.91
Bldg. materials Abs. freq. 27 88 34 33 182
glass, ceramics % by ind. 14.84 48.35 18.68 18.13 100.00
(24) % by size 6.98 10.29 5.89 6.15 7.72
Chemicals Abs. freq. 39 99 76 92 306
% by ind. 12.75 32.35 24.84 32.07 100.00
(25) % by size 10.08 11.58 13.17 17.13 12.99
Non-ferrous Abs. freq. 38 103 53 31 225
metal % by ind. 16.89 45.78 23.56 13.78 100.00
(31) % by size 9.82 12.05 9.19 5.77 9.55
Basic Abs. freq. 29 52 47 33 161
machinery % by ind. 18.01 32.30 29.19 20.50 100.00
(32) % by size 7.49 6.08 8.15 6.15 6.83
O¢ ce Abs. freq. 0 1 0 3 4
machinery % by ind. 0.00 25.00 0.00 75.00 100.00
(33) % by size 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.56 0.17
Electric Abs. freq. 11 29 24 35 99
materials % by ind. 11.11 29.29 24.24 35.35 100.00
(34) % by size 2.84 3.39 4.16 6.52 4.20
Electronic Abs. freq. 3 8 10 14 35
% by ind. 8.57 22.86 28.57 40.00 100.00
(35) % by size 0.78 0.94 1.73 2.61 1.49
Motor vehicles Abs. freq. 8 21 25 36 13
% by ind. 8.89 23.33 27.78 40.00 100.00
(36) % by size 2.07 2.46 4.33 6.70 3.82
Ship Abs. freq. 3 2 2 6 13
building % by ind. 23.08 15.38 15.38 46.15 100.00
(37) % by size 0.78 0.23 0.35 1.12 0.55
Other Abs. freq. 2 5 5 6 18
motor vehicles % by ind. 11.11 27.78 27.78 33.33 100.00
(38) % by size 0.52 0.58 0.87 1.12 0.76
Precision Abs. freq. 2 8 3 4 17
instruments % by ind. 11.76 47.06 17.65 23.53 100.00
(39) % by size 0.52 0.94 0.52 0.74 0.72
37Table 1 (cont.)
Distribution of ￿rms by 2-digit industry and by size
Unbalanced panel 1982-1993 (2356 ￿rms)
Small Med1 Med 2 Large Total
Non-elaborated Abs. freq. 23 83 46 48 230
food % by ind. 23.04 36.09 20.00 20.87 100.00
(41) % by size 13.70 9.71 7.97 8.94 9.76
Food, tobacco Abs. freq. 53 51 31 45 180
and drinks % by ind. 29.44 28.33 17.22 25.00 100.00
(42) % by size 13.70 5.96 5.37 8.38 7.64
Basic Abs. freq. 20 57 53 37 167
Textile % by ind. 11.98 34.13 31.74 22.16 100.00
(43) % by size 5.17 6.67 9.19 6.89 7.09
Leather Abs. freq. 4 16 12 4 36
% by ind. 11.11 44.44 33.33 11.11 100.00
(44) % by size 1.03 1.87 2.08 0.74 1.53
Garment Abs. freq. 11 48 34 22 115
% by ind. 9.57 41.74 29.57 19.13 100.00
(45) % by size 2.84 5.61 5.89 4.10 4.88
Wood and Abs. freq. 21 45 26 8 100
furniture % by ind. 21.00 45.00 26.00 8.00 100.00
(46) % by size 5.43 5.26 4.51 1.49 4.24
Cellulose and Abs. freq. 29 63 42 33 167
paper edition % by ind. 17.37 37.72 25.15 19.76 100.00
(47) % by size 7.49 7.37 7.28 6.15 7.09
Plastic Abs. freq. 22 46 33 17 118
materials % by ind. 18.64 38.98 27.97 14.41 100.00
(48) % by size 5.68 5.38 5.72 3.17 5.01
Other Abs. freq. 7 22 11 8 48
non-basic % by ind. 14.58 45.83 22.92 16.67 100.00
(49) % by size 1.81 2.57 1.91 1.49 2.04
Total Abs. freq. 387 855 577 537 2356
% by ind. 16.43 36.29 24.49 22.79 100.00
% by size 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Note to Table 1
Small means ￿rm￿ s time average of total employment lower or equal than 25. Med 1
means ￿rm￿ s time average of total employment greater than 25 and lower or equal than
75. Med 2 means ￿rm￿ s time average of total employment greater than 75 and lower or
equal than 200. Large means ￿rm￿ s time average of total employment greater than 200.
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Descriptive Statistics Balanced panel 1982-1992 (389 ￿rms)
Variable Period 1982-1984 Period 1989-1992
Pctile 25 Median Pctile 75 Pctile 25 Median Pctile 75
Growth Real Output -6.2% 2.4% 10.5% -7.1% 2.3% 11.5%
Growth Total Employment -3.6% -0.6% 2.6% -5.6% -0.6% 4.4%
Number of Workers 60 131 297 65 137 298
Permanent Workers 55 128 276 56 121 272
Temporary Workers 0 0 3 0 6 22
% Temp Workers 0.0% 0.0% 2.2% 0.0% 4.9% 13.6%
Ratio (Sales / Wage Bill) 4.2 5.7 8.5 4.3 5.6 7.8
Number of observations 1167 1556
39Table 3
Estimation of Production Function Parameters
Unbalanced panel 1982-1993 (2356 ￿rms)(1)
Parameters Least Squares Olley-Pakes
Estimate (S.E.)(2) Estimate (S.E.)(2)
￿K 0.260 (0.006) 0.294 (0028)
￿L 0.690 (0.008) 0.680 (0.036)
Pre-Reform ￿ 0.666 (0.093) 0.549 (0.150)
Post-Reform ￿ 0.895 (0.035) 0.913 (0.054)
Pre-Reform ￿! 0.955 (0.010) 0.957 (0.011)
Post-Reform ￿! 0.931 (0.003) 0.943 (0.003)
Pre-Reform ￿a 0.174 (-) 0.172 (-)
Post-Reform ￿a 0.207 (-) 0.204 (-)
# Observations(3) 16,640 15,985
Notes to Table 3
(1) All the estimations include time dummies and 20 industry dummies.
(2) Standard errors robust to heterocedasticity and autocorrelation.
(3) The sample in Olley-Pakes estimation is restricted to those observations with
investment di⁄erent than zero, what explains the smaller sample size.
40Table 4
Distribution of Employment Changes. Unbalanced panel
PRE-REFORM PERIOD: 1982-1984
Change in Temporary Employment
% ￿ ￿3 ￿2 ￿1 0 +1 +2 ￿ +3 Total
￿ ￿3 3:2 0:5 2:2 22:8 2:2 1:1 6:0 37:9
Change
in ￿2 0:3 0:3 0:4 3:8 0:4 0:2 0:5 5:9
Permanent
Employment ￿1 0:4 0:1 0:3 6:5 0:5 0:4 0:5 8:8
0 1:1 0:2 0:6 9:5 1:3 0:6 1:8 15:1
+1 0:6 0:1 0:5 4:6 0:8 0:4 0:6 7:4
+2 0:5 0:1 0:2 2:5 0:3 0:2 0:8 4:4
￿ +3 2:3 0:5 0:7 11:7 0:9 0:4 3:8 20:4
Total 8:5 1:7 4:9 61:3 6:3 3:4 13:9 100:0
POST-REFORM PERIOD: 1989-1992
Change in Temporary Employment
% ￿ ￿3 ￿2 ￿1 0 +1 +2 ￿ +3 Total
￿ ￿3 5:5 1:1 1:5 10:1 1:7 1:2 7:9 28:9
Change
in ￿2 0:8 0:2 0:3 2:6 0:7 0:3 1:1 5:9
Permanent
Employment ￿1 0:9 0:3 0:7 4:1 0:7 0:4 1:3 8:4
0 1:5 0:5 1:4 11:3 1:6 1:0 2:3 19:6
+1 1:0 0:3 0:8 3:2 0:9 0:4 1:2 7:7
+2 0:5 0:4 0:5 2:6 0:5 0:3 0:9 5:8
￿ +3 6:3 0:7 0:8 7:7 1:0 1:1 6:0 23:7
Total 16:5 3:5 6:0 41:5 7:0 4:7 20:7 100:0
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Estimation of of the Dynamic Labor Demand Model
Unbalanced panel 1982-1993 (2356 ￿rms)(1)
AC Parameters Period 1982-1984 Period 1985-1988 Period 1989-1992






0:012 1:417￿￿ 0:018 0:097￿￿ 0:028 0:049






0:183￿￿ 0:181￿￿ 0:117￿￿ 0:107￿￿ 0:101￿￿ 0:089￿￿






0:0003 0:0001 0:0006 ￿0:0001 0:0005 ￿0:0008






0:083￿￿ 0:067 0:136￿￿ 0:061 0:080￿￿ 0:058






0:514￿￿ 0:098￿￿ 0:464￿￿ 0:060 0:528￿￿ 0:051






￿0:00043￿ ￿0:00006 0:00006 0:00037 ￿0:0006 0:0005
(0:00022) (0:0011) (0:0007) (0:0008) (0:0008) (0:0009)













Period 1982-1984 Period 1985-1988 Period 1989-1992
# Observations 2;274 7;219 6;257
LR Index(2) 0:232 0:220 0:267
Notes to Table 5
(1) All the parameters are unit-free because all ￿ring and hiring costs are proportional to the
￿rm-speci￿c average wage ￿ Wi. Standard errors are reported between parentheses.
(2) The LR (Likelihood Ratio) Index is a measure of goodness of ￿t de￿ned as 1 ￿ (log ^ L=logL0),
where log ^ L is the log-likelihood of the estimated model, and logL0 is the log-likelihood under
the the hypothesis that all parameters except ￿0;i are equal to zero.
42Table 6
Goodness of Fit Measures of the Estimated Model
Unbalanced panel 1982-1993 (2356 ￿rms)
Statistics Period 1983-1984 Period 1985-1988 Period 1989-1992
Model Model Model
(Empirical) (Empirical) (Empirical)
Permanent Employment 98.0 64.0 59.0
per Firm (Median) (95.0) (66.0) (56.0)
Proportion of Temporary 4.4% 6.6% 11.8%
Workers (Mean) (4.3%) (6.9%) (11.3)
Percentage of 14.8% 18.1% 19.7%
Zeroes in ￿LP (15.1%) (18.8%) (19.6%)
Percentage of 46.9% 39.8% 28.1%
Zeroes in ￿LT (52.8%) (43.9%) (32.5%)
Median Value of dP 4.0% 4.8% 5.6%
Conditional of dP > 0 (3.9%) (5.2%) (5.7%)
Median Value of dP -3.9% -4.0% -5.1%
Conditional of dP < 0 (-3.8%) (-4.3%) (-5.2%)
Median Value of dT 1.7% 2.9% 4.0%
Conditional of dT > 0 (1.7%) (2.7%) (4.2%)
Median Value of dT -1.3% -2.3% -3.7%
Conditional of dT < 0 (-1.4%) (-2.0%) (-3.8%)
Cross-sectional Variance 1.64 1.66 1.56
log Perm. Employment (1.66) (1.72) (1.59)
Cross-sectional Variance 1.54 1.60 1.49
log Total Employment (1.59) (1.64) (1.51)
43Table 7
Evaluation of the Labor Market Reform
Statistics Pre-Reform Post-Reform Counterfactual
Economy(1) Economy(1) Reform(1)
Permanent Employment per Firm (Median) 99.0 89.1 (-10.0%) 105.5 (+6.6%)
Total Employment per Firm (Median) 102.7 106.3 (+3.5%) 106.9 (+4.1)
Proportion of Temporary Workers (Mean) 3.8% 16.2% 1.3%
Median Absolute Value of dP 2.9% 2.5% 4.2%
Median Absolute Value of dT 0.0% 3.1% 0.9%
Output per Firm (Median)(2) 100 100.7 101.9
Value of a Firm (Median)(2) 100 101.2 104.8
Notes to Table 7
(1) The values of the structural parameters are: for the pre-reform model, the ones estimated for the period
1983-1984; for the post-reform model, the ones estimated for the period 1989-1992; for the





which were reduced by half.
(2) The output-per-￿rm and the ￿rm value in the pre-reform model are normalized to 100.
44Figure 1: Unemployment rate and GDP growth in Spain.








































 Unemployment rate  Rate of change of GDP
















45Figure 2: Share of temporary employment in total employment.
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46Figure 3: Rates of growth of output and employment.
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47Figure 4: Share of temporary employment in total employment, by ￿rm average size.
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48Figure 5: Rates of job creation and job destruction by type of contract (weighted averages).
Source: CBBE sample of Spanish manufacturing ￿rms.
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49Figure 6: Net changes in permanent employment.
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50Figure 7: Time Series of the Estimated Average Wages
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51Figure 8: Histograms of Discretized Decision and State Variables
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